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Abstract: With the continuous development of the computers networks, new
problems have been posed in the process of keys management in the crypto-
graphic systems. The main element in the cryptographic technologies is the
keys management, as the cryptographic algorithms are known, while the keys
have to be either secret (for unauthorized users that do not need them), or
public (for users that need them). With an eﬃcient cryptographic keys man-
agement system and the existing encryption techniques, there may be imple-
mented a proper security system in the informational systems of the organiza-
tions. The process of cryptographic keys management consists in the following
operations: keys generation, distribution, update, revocation, storage, back-
up/ recovery, import and export, usage control, expiration, and destruction.
The cryptographic keys management techniques depend on the type of the
keys, i.e. symmetric or public. Nowadays, the eﬀorts of the researches in the
cryptographic keys management are focused on the standardization and inter-
operability of the keys management. In this paper, the authors analyze the
existing keys management systems and standards available for the keys man-
agement techniques, emphasizing the advantages and disadvantages of diﬀerent
systems. They also propose a cryptographic keys management model based on
the ideas and principles of the INTERRAP architecture (a conceptual model
developed by Jőrg Műller for intelligent agents). Also, there are incorporated
some intelligent techniques to manage emergency situations, such as keys losing
or their improper usage.
Keywords: cryptographic key management, intelligent agents, key manage-
ment model.
1 Introduction
The key management is the core of a cryptographic system. The processes related to the key
management consist in generation, distribution, update, revocation, storage, backup/recovery,
import and export, usage control, expiration, and destruction of the cryptographic keys. Prac-
tically, the security of the information is assured by keeping secret the private cryptographic
keys. Key management consists in a set of protocols that enable to establish and maintain the
keying relationships between the entities of a network [6]. The concept of “keying relationship”is
deﬁned in [6] as the state wherein parties of the cryptosystems share keying material. According
to the type of cryptographic algorithm used in a cryptosystem, there are two situations: key
management used in a symmetric cryptosystem and key management used in an asymmetric
cryptosystem. In the former case, the sender and the receiver share the same secret key or two
keys computationally feasible and in the latter case, there are involved two transformations: one
to generate the public key and the other to generate the private key. [6] [11] The techniques
used to distribute conﬁdential keys are: key layering, key translation center, and symmetric
Copyright c 2006-2011 by CCC Publications
Intelligent Management of the Cryptographic Keys 151
key certiﬁcate techniques. Key layering comprises the following techniques: master key, key en-
crypting keys and data keys. Key Translation Center (KTC ) consists in a trusted server, which
allows two entities to establish a secure communication using long-term keys. Techniques used
to distribute public keys are: point to point delivery over a trusted channel, direct access to a
trusted public ﬁle (public-key registry), use of an online trusted server, use of an oﬀ-line server
and certiﬁcates, and use of systems implicitly guaranteeing authenticity of public parameters [6].
The advantages of using the keys management in the situation of a public key are: use of a
simple key management, on-line trusted server not-required and enhancing the functionality of
the system.
In this paper, there is studied the problem of the cryptographic key management in large dis-
tributed systems, more speciﬁcally, the problems of keys distribution and generation. The main
concepts used in this paper are the security domain and the keys graph. The concept of security
domain is deﬁned in [7] as “a collection of systems (servers, devices, and so on) that share a
common set of keys and are attached to an administered network”. In this paper the concept is
used in the sense of a collection of entities (to allow an abstractive interpretation) which share
a private key. The concept of key graph was introduced in [10] as an arrangement of the keys
into a hierarchy and a key server manages all keys. A particular keys hierarchy is the keys tree,
which enables to deﬁne key management scheme. In this paper it is proposed an intelligent key
management model suited to the structure of the network.
The new ideas introduced in this paper are: combining the behaviour agent architecture into the
key distribution problem and distribution based on CRT (Chinese Reminder Theorem [13]).
The paper is structured as follows:
 formalism of the key management problem, that studies the existing key management
systems and introduces the concept of security domain graph;
 backgrounds of the intelligent key management model, referring to the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem, as an important calculation algorithm used in order to generate the key
management model;
 intelligent key management, proposing a model of the cryptographic key management that
may be used in a SDG type architecture, based on the principles of the INTERRAP
architecture, introducing intelligent agents responsible with the key management in the
cryptographic system;
 conclusions, that emphasize the importance of the key management and the advantages
oﬀered by the proposed model.
2 Formalism of the key management problem
To formalize the problem of keys management in a computers communication system, there
are deﬁned the security domain and a partially ordered relation between security domains. A
security domain is a set of the entities (users, data, hardware devices, etc.) which share the same
secret key. So, it can be established an equivalence relation between two entities e1, e2, according
to the following statement:
e1 e2 if e1, e2 share the same secret key.
The equivalence relation between two entities produces equivalence classes, called security do-
mains.
Let us consider n security domains SD={SD1;SD2, ..., SDn}. The set SD contains all the entities
of the computer communications system. On the set of the security domains, it can be deﬁned
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a binary partially-ordered relationship, using the operator .
The relation SDjSD i means that the entities of the security domain SD i have a security clear-
ance higher or equal than that of the entities of the security domain SD j . For example, the
entities from SD i can decrypt the message received from the entities that belong to SDj . Also,
it is used the expression that the security domain SD i dominates the security domain SDj . In
this way, one may determine a partially ordered set (SD, ) , shortly called poset. Messages
(data, plain texts) from the security class SD i are encrypted with the cryptographic key sk i and
data from the security domain SDj are encrypted with the cryptographic key sk j . If there is the
relation SD jSD i , the entities of the security domain SD i have the right to decrypt the cipher
text using the cryptographic key sk i. In contrast, the entities which are parts of the security
domains, SD j , cannot decrypt the messages received from the entities of the security domain
SD i . Also, if the following relations between three security domains SDkSDj and SDjSD i,
are true, that means that the entities of SDj can decrypt the cipher texts received from the
entities of SDk and the entities of SD i can decrypt the cipher texts received from the entities of
SDj . Consequently, the entities of SD i can decrypt the cipher texts received directly from the
entities of SDk.
In this manner, there are generated domains hierarchies. A Hasse diagram can represent a poset.
This diagram is called in [1] a security class privilege graph (SCPG), in this paper it is used the
term of security domain graph (SDG). An example of SDG is shown in ﬁgure 1 (a - security
domains tree (SDT), b - a general security domain graph (GSDG)).
Figure 1: Security Domain Graph
where the following representations have the similar sense (ﬁgure 2)
The most simple keys management model assumes the existence of a keys server and if an entity
Figure 2: Graphical representation of a partially-ordered relationship between two security do-
mains
needs to decrypt a message, it has to ask the proper key over a secure channel, or each security
domain has to store all successors secret keys. These models are not really feasible, because the
tendencies of increasing the networks dimensions require large storage spaces and a lot of secure
channels. In this way, there is quite a challenge to deﬁne a keys management model properly
adjusted to the security domain graph.
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3 Backgrounds of the Intelligent Key Management Model
There were proposed a lot of cryptographic keys management architecture. To implement
Data Encryption Standard, IBM proposed a Key Management Scheme for DES in the 70’ years.
The cryptographic keys management architecture consists in cryptographic systems connected
via a communications network. Each cryptographic system has a cryptographic facility, a crypto-
graphic key data set, a cryptographic facility access program and is using application programs.
One solution based on control vector is proposed in [5]. The scheme uses a control vectors which
facilities the implementation of owner key management policy and rules. This technique enables
key distribution in diﬀerent environments: peer-to-peer distribution, key distribution center, and
key translation center. A list of keys management architecture can be found at [8].
Akl and Taylor proposed the ﬁrst cryptographic keys assignment scheme to solve problems re-
lated to access control in hierarchies (AT scheme). According to AT scheme [1], each security
class (the security class contains data and users with the same rights) has associated a secret key
and a public parameter. For a relation SC jSC i , SC i use the public parameter T j and the
secret key k i to derive the secret key k j . The secret key k i is computed according the formula
ki = k
Ti
0 (modM), where k0 is the secret key of the Central Authority and M is the product of
two secret large prime numbers. T i is a public parameter with the following property: SC jSC i
, if T j is a multiple of T i. In order to generate the public parameters, for T i it is used the for-
mula Ti =
Q
SCiNOTSCk
pk, where pk are prime numbers related to each security class.The major
inconvenient of the method is the fact that the value of T i increases and will become impractical
(ﬁgure 3). Another problem is represented by the question: is the arrangement of the security
Figure 3: The diagram of generating the T parameter in an AT scheme
domains according to the SDG? (that is, when a security domain has more than one parent).
In order to generate a model for the key management, the authors studied the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem that is an ancient, but important calculation algorithm in modular arithmetic. It
enables one to solve simultaneous equations with respect to diﬀerent moduli in a considerable
generality. Here is the statement of the problem that the Chinese Remainder Theorem solves.
Theorem 1. Chinese Remainder Theorem [12]. Let
m1, m2, ..., mk 2Z with gcd(mi, mj)=1,any i,j=1; k, i 6=j . Let m be the product
m=m1m2...mk . Let a1, a2, ...,ak 2Z . Consider the system:
xa1(mod m1)
xa2(mod m2)
...
xak(mod mk)
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Then there exists exactly one x2Zmsolution of the system.
The solution to the system above may be obtained using the following algorithm:
Step 1 For each to i=1 to k calculate z i=m1m2...mi 1mi+1...mk
Step 2 For each to i=1 to k calculate y i=z 1i (mod mi)
Step 3 Calculate x=a1y1z 1+...+akykz k, Return x.
4 Intelligent Key Management
In this paper it is proposed a model of cryptographic keys management that may be used in
the architecture of SDG type. Each entity of the security domains has associated an intelligent
agent (SDKMA) responsible with the cryptographic key management in the system (ﬁgure 4).
where SD i=ei1Uei2Uei3..., where e ij use k i and each SD i is organized according to the schema
Figure 4: Security Domains Graph and Intelligent Key Management Agents
shown in ﬁgure 5.
Figure 5: The entities relations in a security domain
Each SDKMA is structured according the INTERRAP intelligent agent architecture deﬁned
by Műller [9]. INTERRAP architecture is a layered BDI model (belief-desire-intention model)
with three layers: behavior based layer, local planning layer, and cooperative planning layer. The
behavior based layer contains the reactivity and procedural knowledge used in routine tasks, the
local planning layer provides reasoning to realize the local tasks and to produce goal oriented
behaviors, and the cooperative planning layer enables and facilities collaborative work with other
agents. The structure of SDKMA is presented in ﬁgure 6.
Behavior planning layer acts in the emergency situations (renewal keys, delete entity, add en-
tity, destroy keys). Local planning layer manages the cryptographic keys within the framework
of the security domain. Cooperative planning layer manages the cryptographic keys between
security domains.
World KB contains the procedures and functions used in the emergency situations (structure
Intelligent Management of the Cryptographic Keys 155
Figure 6: The structure of SDKMA
of the networks and security domains, new arrivals and leaving of the entities). Planning KB
contains procedures and functions responsible with the key management within the framework of
the security domain and social KB contains procedures and functions used to key management
between security domains. These knowledge bases are self-updated; therefore, the keys manage-
ment model has the property of ﬂexibility that is modiﬁcations in the structure of the network
cause modiﬁcations in the key management model. Keys management within the framework of
security domains can be realized according to key server schema. For each security domains, it is
selected, in a randomized way, an entity. Its SDKMA will play the role of key server. The server
stores the key and the associated list of the entities from the security domain. Entities request
the key to the server. Upon entity authentication, the server sends the keying material if the
entity is authorized. Key management between security domains can be realized according toAT
scheme if the node corresponding to the security domain has one parent. The arrangement in
security domains oﬀers the advantage of calculating not greater values of parameters T. There
were provided solutions to optimize the AT schema in order to compute smaller values of pa-
rameters T [4]. If the relations between security domains are according to the scheme presented
in ﬁgure 7, then one has the following situation: a node has more than one parents and a node
has more than two ancestors.
Figure 7: Security domain SD3 with two parents and two ancestors
If an entity of SD3 broadcasts a message m, than the entities of SD1 and SD2 can decrypt the
156 G. Moise, O. Cangea
cipher text c. So, the entities have to know a single decryption key. The asymmetric keys genera-
tor has to send to each security domains a private key or each SDKMA can compute (cooperative
planning layer) the private key using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. For each entity (SD1
and SD2) it will select a large secret prime number n1, respectively n2. The secret key is the
solution (in the space Zn1n2 ) of the system:
xa1(mod n1)
xa2(mod n2), where a1 , a2 are public parameters.
To calculate the solution of the system, it can be used the Lagrange method:
Step 1 Find cofactors u12, u21 using Extended Euclidian algorithm
Step 2 Calculate l1=u21m2 , l2=u12m1
Step 3 Calculate the solution x=a1l2+a2l2
If one entity of SD4 and one entity of SD5 broadcast in the same time two encrypted messages
c4 and c5, the SDKMA (the cooperative planning layer) of each entity of SD3 manage a waiting
queue and decrypt the messages using randomized priorities.
The advantages oﬀered by the proposed model are: more securely, because the intelligent property
changes any time the parameters used in keys generation, and more eﬃciently, through the use
of a security domain based structure of the network. The dynamism of the network can be easily
implemented because the knowledge bases related to each layer of the SDKMA are updated
with actual information in any moment. Also, in order to generate the keys, the procedures
and functions may contain diﬀerent algorithms and the SDKMA can change any time the key
distribution algorithms according to the dimensions of the networks or the necessary security
level.
5 Conclusions
Starting from the analysis of the existing key management systems and standards available
for the keys management techniques, in this paper it is proposed an intelligent cryptographic key
management model between security domains, SDKMA type, based on the ideas and principles
of the INTERRAP architecture, emphasizing the advantages referring to security, eﬃciency and
feasibility. As future directions, one may consider designing a fuzzy model of the cryptographic
key management system, but only if this approach would bring important improvements for the
model, regarding to the procedures and functions used to generate the keys. Nevertheless, the
most secure situation is to hold the keys in secure hardware and perform all processing there [3],
being impossible to achieve this goal in large scale networks.
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